David Stevens

Some moral philosophers (e.g., Russell 2010; 2014; Dixon 2015) have claimed that certain forms of martial art/self-defence training increase the risk of societal violence because of their training methods. These methods – such as cultivating interpersonal aggression – are designed to reduce (or have the consequence of reducing) psychological barriers against harming others (Miller 2008; Bowman 2014). Lowering that barrier provides the individual with the live option of violence in circumstances where it would previously have been unavailable to them. This provides one reason against the moral permissibility of such training. In contrast, others (Channon and Matthews 2012; Vertonghen and Theeboom 2010) argue that, as an empirical matter, martial arts instil ethical boundaries against harming others. In this paper, I advance a different, normative, response to the initial claim. I argue that even if it were in fact the case that such training increased the likelihood of violence, this is not necessarily sufficient to demonstrate its moral impermissibility. Self-defence, I argue, is a deontological moral right and as such requires the agent has available the means for the effective exercise of that right. Many people lack that means without training, including the psychological capacity to harm. From here I argue that the right to self-defence makes the imposition of a risk of certain harms on non-responsible third parties permissible where those harms are foreseen but not intended. Moreover, I argue, this permission applies to a far wider set of individuals than the authors I argue against typically mandate.